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International Cooperation and Tax 
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and Development  
2 rue André-Pascal 
75775 Paris France 
 
 
December 2nd, 2019 
 
Comments to Public Consultation Document: Global Anti-Base Erosion 
Proposal (“GloBE”) - Pillar Two 
 
Dear Achim,  
On behalf of the Institute for Tax Law of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 
(Belgium) and the Tax Policy Center (www.unil.ch/taxpolicy) of the University of 
Lausanne (Switzerland), we are pleased to attach herewith our comments 
relating to the Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal (“GloBE”) - Pillar Two. 
We appreciate the opportunity to provide these comments. As a matter of 
principle, we fully and strongly support the efforts of the Inclusive Framework on 
BEPS to arrive at a multilateral consensus in this area.   
We would be glad to attend the public consultation and present the views 
expressed in the attached document.   
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Luc De Broe   Prof. Dr. Robert J. Danon         Prof. Dr. Vikram Chand  
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1. Structure of our comments1  
 
1. The present submission is composed of seven sections. We begin with 
some introductory remarks and general policy considerations (2). 
Next, we turn to the scope of the GloBE proposal (3), the issue of 
blending (4) and carve-outs (5). Finally, sections 6 and 7 are 
dedicated to the compatibility of the proposal from a tax treaty and 
European law perspective (7).  
 
2. Introductory remarks and general policy considerations  
 
2. The GloBE Proposal2 seeks to allocate additional fiscal revenues to the 
jurisdiction of the ultimate parent of the MNE Group or, as a back up 
measure, to market countries when the effective tax rates fall below a 
minimum rate.  
 
3. Technically, the proposal would first of all be put into effect by an 
income inclusion rule on which the present submission primarily 
focuses. This rule would allow residence countries to tax the income of 
a foreign branch or a controlled entity if that income was subject to tax 
at an effective rate that is below a minimum rate.3 It is obvious that 
this part of the GloBE proposal is inspired from the US global intangible 
low-taxed income rules (“GILTI”)4. By mirrored policy, a so-called 
“switch-over-rule” would be introduced into tax treaties with a view to 
                                   
1    The authors are grateful to the members of the research team of the Tax Policy 
Center of the University of Lausanne dedicated to Pillar One and Two, in particular 
to Mr. Lionel Reboh and Mr. Benjamin Malek for their help in selecting the various 
sources relating to the preparation of this submission and as regards the editing  
2 OECD, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal (“GloBE”) - Pillar Two, Public consultation 
document, 8 November – 2 December 2019.  
3       OECD, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal, supra n. 2, at para. 5. 
4     See Section 951A US Internal Revenue Code. Also see Internal Revenue Service, 
Guidance Related to Section 951A (Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income) and 
Certain Guidance Related to Foreign Tax Credits, June 21st 2019 available on 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/06/21/2019-12437/guidance-
related-to-section-951a-global-intangible-low-taxed-income-and-certain-guidance-
related-to   
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allow states applying the exemption method5 to switch to the credit 
method where profits attributable to a foreign permanent 
establishment or derived from immovable property are insufficiently 
taxed by the source state.6  
 
 
4. From the perspective of the source State, the proposal would entail the 
introduction of an under-taxed payments rule operating by way of a 
denial of a deduction or imposition of source-based taxation (including 
withholding tax) for a payment to a related party if that payment is not 
subject to tax at or above a minimum rate in the hands of the 
recipient.7 Finally, the latter rule would also be complemented by a 
subject to tax rule allowing the source state to deny (or adjust) treaty 
benefits on such payments.8  
 
5. In light of the foregoing, the order of priority of these rules arises. In 
our view, the income inclusion rules applying at the level of the State 
of residence should be given priority. Of course, in a multi tiers 
corporate structure, rules neutralizing possible double taxation cases 
should also be provided.  
 
6. The GloBE proposal is at tension with the policy agreed and 
implemented so far by the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative. This policy 
indeed seeks to reunite income with substantial activities,9 but at the 
same time, recognizes that each state is free to set its own tax rates.  
This policy has in particular been implemented by BEPS Actions 8-10 
which provide detailed guidance on the concept of control over risk or 
                                   
5       Art. 23(A) OECD MC. 
6       OECD, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal, supra n. 2, at para. 5. 
7        OECD, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal, supra n. 2, at para. 5. 
8        OECD, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal, supra n. 2, at para. 5. 
9 V. Chand, Allocation of Taxing Rights in the Digitalized Economy: Assessment of 
Potential Policy Solutions and Recommendation for a Simplified Profit Split Method? 
47 (12) Intertax, 2019, pp. 1023-1026. Also see K. Ming Ho, C. Turley, GloBE – 
Overriding the Value Creation Principle as Lodestone of International Tax Rules?, 47 
(12) Intertax, 2019, pp. 1070-1073. 
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DEMPE activities10 and, of course, by BEPS Action 5 relating to harmful 
tax practices and inter alia the introduction of a so-called “modified 
nexus approach” for IP regimes.11  In particular, the final report on 
BEPS Action 5 notes that: “The work on harmful tax practices is not 
intended to promote the harmonisation of income taxes or tax structures 
generally within or outside the OECD, nor is it about dictating to any 
country what should be the appropriate level of tax rates. Rather, the 
work is about reducing the distortionary influence of taxation on the 
location of mobile financial and service activities, thereby encouraging an 
environment in which free and fair tax competition can take place.12  
 
7. As we understand it, the GloBE proposal, if it were to be implemented 
strictly, would entail a departure from this initial policy in that GloBE 
would focus on no or low taxation of mobile income irrespective of the 
existence of substantial activities. It is submitted that such a new 
policy would alter the consistency of the BEPS initiative which has just 
been implemented, would be difficult to reconcile with the principle of 
proportionality and, as discussed in this submission13, would raise 
compatibility issues from a European law perspective.  
 
8. Therefore, we welcome that the Programme of Work calls for the 
exploration of carve-outs, including for regimes compliant with the 
standards of BEPS Action 5 and, more generally, other substance-
based carve-outs.14 This issue, which is discussed below,15 would in 
particular be relevant if, contrary to the opinion advocated in this 
                                   
10 OECD, Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, Revised Guidelines 
on Action 8-10, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, (OECD 
Publishing, Oct. 2015). 
11  OECD, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account 
Transparency and Substance, Action 5 - 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2015. For a critical discussion 
see among others Danon R., Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Tax Incentives on 
Research and Development (R&D), 2015 (General Report), n°100a, p. 51 et seq 
12  OECD, supra n. 11, at para. 3 
13      See below section 7. 
14      OECD, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal, supra n. 2, at para. 74. 
15      See below section 5. 
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submission which favors a worldwide blending, the GloBE proposal was 
to be implemented by an entity or jurisdictional blending.16   
 
 
9. In light of the need to coordinate the GloBE proposal with the existing 
measures introduced by the BEPS initiative (in particular in relation to 
the value creation pillar), we would also find it desirable to conduct an 
impact assessment of such measures before taking a final stand on the 
terms of the GloBE proposal.  
 
10. The consultation document notes that: “The GloBE proposal is based 
on the premise that, in the absence of a co-ordinated and multilateral 
solution, there is a risk of uncoordinated, unilateral action, both to 
attract more tax base and to protect existing tax base, with adverse 
consequences for all jurisdictions”.12     We would agree but would then 
take it that the enactment of the GloBE proposal would be closely 
coordinated with or possibly switch off existing unilateral measures 
adopted by states in this area. Such necessary coordination would 
concern both residence and source countries. Let us for example bear 
in mind that BEPS Action 3 relating to CFC regimes which is not a 
minimum standard has not resulted into a unified approach in this 
area17. The same holds true within the European Union in which ATAD 
I has only resulted in a limited degree of harmonization and, therefore, 
has been described as potentially inducing a fragmentation of the 
internal market18. A similar outcome would clearly not be desirable in 
the context of the GloBE proposal. 
 
 
 
                                   
16      See below thereupon section 4. 
17      OECD, Designing Effective Controlled Foreign Company Rules, Action 3 - 2015 Final 
Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
2015.  
18    See thereupon Danon R., La règle sur les sociétés contrôlées de la directive 
européenne anti-évasion fiscale : analyse critique et impact pour la Suisse, in IFF 
Forum für Steuerrecht, 2016, pp. 286-319. 
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3. Scope  
 
11. We believe that the GloBE proposal would need to be as neutral as 
possible and should apply to all MNEs across the board.   
12. This being said, it would desirable for the new rules to apply only to 
MNE Groups that exceed a certain consolidated revenue threshold19. 
From an efficiency perspective (compliance costs) this would in 
particular make sense. For example, a possible threshold could be Euro 
750 Million that is similar to the threshold set in the Country by 
Country Reporting (CBCR) standard20. This threshold, although used in 
a different context, was also indicated in the Pillar I proposal21 and is 
also found in proposals with respect to digital service taxes (or DSTs) 
proposed either by the European Union22 or some countries such as 
Austria23, Spain24, France25, Italy26 and New Zealand27. The UK28 uses a 
comparable threshold of GBP 500 Million.  
 
                                   
19 OECD, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal, supra n. 2, at para. 75.  
20 OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 
13 - 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD 
Publishing, Oct. 2015). 
21 OECD, Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One, OECD/G20 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing, October 2019), at para. 
20.  
22 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common System of a 
Digital Services Tax on Revenues Resulting from the Provision of Certain Digital 
Services, COM(2018) 148 final, 2018/0073(CNS), (21 Mar. 2018).       
23 Austria: Digitalsteuergesetz 2020 (132/ME), Art. 1, para 2.  
24 Spain: Proyecto de Ley del Impuesto sobre Determinados Servicios Digitales, Art. 
8.    
25 France: LOI n° 2019-759 du 24 juillet 2019 portant création d'une taxe sur les 
services numériques et modification de la trajectoire de baisse de l'impôt sur les 
sociétés, ad Art. 299, §III.   
26 Italy: Bilancio di previsione dello Stato per l’anno finanziario 2019 e bilancio 
pluriennale per il triennio 2019-2021, n. 36, p. 8.     
27 NZ: New Zealand Government, Options for Taxing the Digital Economy – a 
Government Discussion Document, (June 2019).      
28 UK: Draft Legislation on the New Digital Services Tax, p. 4.  
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4. Blending: World-wide vs Jurisdictional vs Entity Approach   
 
13. In order to determine the effective tax rates, the public consultation 
document puts forward three approaches viz., a worldwide blending 
approach, a jurisdictional blending approach and an entity by entity 
blending approach29.  
 
14. In our opinion, the worldwide blending approach,30 at least from a 
conceptual standpoint, seems to be the simplest approach. Also, this 
approach, intuitively, seems to entail low compliance costs for tax 
administrations and MNE Groups.31 Further, the approach seems to 
reduce the volatility in effective tax rates that are attributable to 
temporary differences.32 Moreover, issues concerning income allocation 
between branch and head offices33 as well as transparent entities34 
become less onerous under this approach. Furthermore, issues 
concerning crediting taxes35 as well as treatment of intra group 
dividends36 become less problematic under this approach. All these 
parameters indicate that the worldwide blending approach would 
reduce administrative complexity and the compliance burden in 
comparison to the other approaches. Thus, at this stage and for the 
                                   
29 OECD, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal, supra n. 2, at para. 55.  
30 It is also our understanding the US follows a similar approach with respect to its 
GILTI provisions. In fact, the US Senate Committee states: “The Committee 
believes that calculating GILTI on an aggregate basis, instead of on a CFC-by-CFC 
basis, reflects the interconnected nature of a U.S. corporation's global operations 
and is a more accurate way of determining a U.S. corporation's global intangible 
income”. See Committee on the Budget of United States Senate, Committee 
Recommendations Pusuant to H.Con. Res. 71, available on 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-115SPRT27718/pdf/CPRT-
115SPRT27718.pdf. Also, see  M.Herzfeld, What the OECD Can Learn From the 
GILTI Regime, available on https://www.taxnotes.com/featured-analysis/what-
oecd-can-learn-gilti-regime/2019/01/11/291qz  
31 OECD, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal, supra n. 2, at para. 56.  
32 OECD, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal, supra n. 2, at paras. 60-61.  
33 OECD, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal, supra n. 2, at para. 64.  
34 OECD, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal, supra n. 2, at para. 67.  
35 OECD, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal, supra n. 2, at para. 68.  
36 OECD, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal, supra n. 2, at para. 71.  
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foregoing reasons, we express a preference for this approach.  
 
 
5. Carve-outs 
 
15. The consultation document reiterates that the Programme of Work 
calls inter alia for the exploration of carve-outs, including for (i) a 
return on tangible assets (ii) regimes compliant with the standards of 
BEPS Action 5 on harmful tax practices, and (iii) other substance-
based carve-outs.37 The existence of such carve-outs would be in 
particular relevant if, contrary to our opinion supporting a worldwide 
blending, an entity or jurisdictional approach were to be favored. 
 
 
16. In our opinion, a carve out for a return on tangible assets would 
certainly make sense from a policy perspective. The discussion on the 
need to carve out regimes compliant with BEPS Action 5 (in particular 
IP regimes compliant with the modified nexus approach) is not entirely 
new and arose already in relation to BEPS Action 3 and CFC regimes.  
 
17. At the time, one of the authors of this submission,38 with whom we are 
in agreement, had already argued that IP income falling within the 
scope of the modified nexus approach should not be caught by a CFC 
legislation. A number of reasons were put forward to justify this 
conclusion. First of all, the modified nexus approach, which is inspired 
from R&D input incentives, is a proportionate approach linking IP 
income to R&D activities39 conducted by the taxpayer (subjective 
approach applying within the European Union) or locally (territorial 
approach).40 Therefore, the decisive importance given to the 
substantial activity criterion for the purpose of tackling harmful tax 
                                   
37      OECD, Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal, supra n. 2, at para. 74 
38  Danon R., Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Tax Incentives on Research and 
Development (R&D), 2015 (General Report), n°100a, p. 51 et seq. 
39  Technically to R&D expenditures used as a proxy. 
40  Subject to the 30% uplift. 
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competition has entailed an increased convergence with CFC rules in 
the sense that in both areas the focus is on the nexus of an item of 
income with a substantial activity. For this reason, therefore, the 
modified nexus already addresses concerns raised by CFC regimes. 
Secondly, from a policy perspective, if a CFC regime may pick up 
income falling within the scope of a modified nexus compliant IP 
regime, this would essentially mean that the revenues forgone by a 
state to promote R&D activities through a substantial activity-based 
incentive could simply be taxed away by another state. At the same 
time, however, this connection between BEPS Action 5 and 3 was not 
formally established (also partly because BEPS Action 3 merely 
introduces best practices).  
 
18. We of course appreciate that the GloBE proposal pursues different 
policy objectives. However, such proposal should not alter the 
consistency of the existing BEPS outcome. Therefore, we submit that 
the foregoing argument remains fully valid in the context of the GloBE 
Proposal. In addition, carving out regimes compliant with BEPS Action 
5 (in particular IP regimes) would ensure the consistency of the GloBE 
Proposal with the existing BEPS outcome. Finally, a carve out for 
regimes compliant with BEPS Action 5 would be easy to administer and 
promote tax certainty as such regimes are now well delineated and 
monitored.  
 
19. This being said, as discussed below, a more general carve-out would 
also need to be foreseen in order to ensure the compatibility of the 
GloBE proposal with European law.41 
 
6. Compatibility with Tax Treaty Law   
 
20. The income inclusion rule could trigger compatibility issues with tax 
treaty law, in particular, Article 7 OECD MC which deals with business 
                                   
41  See section 7 below. 
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income, Article 9 OECD MC relating to associated enterprises, Article 
10(5) OECD MC pertaining to taxation of undistributed profits as well 
as Article 21 which deals with other income.42 This being said, since 
2003, the OECD Commentary clearly states that CFC rules do not 
conflict with tax treaty obligations.43 In several jurisdictions, courts 
decisions have also confirmed this position.44 Therefore, it may be 
assumed that the same conclusion would apply to the income inclusion 
rule contemplated by the GloBE Proposal.  
 
21. The base eroding payments rule that denies a deduction to the payor, 
if applicable only for payments made to non-residents, could also 
trigger compatibility issues with tax treaty law. Specifically, issues 
could arise with respect to compatibility with Article 9 OECD MC with 
deals with associated enterprises and the non discrimination 
provisions45 viz., Article 24(4) OECD MC which deals with deduction 
non-discrimination46 and Article 24(5) which deals with ownership non-
discrimination.47  
 
22. In order to avoid potential conflicts, we would recommend that a 
provision (safeguard clause) be inserted by States into their tax treaty 
policy (bilaterally or, preferably, through a multilateral instrument). 
                                   
42 For a detailed discussion on this matter, see L. De Broe, International Tax Planning 
and Prevention of Abuse, Vol. 14 – Doctoral Series, IBFD, Amsterdam, 2008, pp. 
575-652. Also see V. Chand, The Interaction of Domestic Anti-Avoidance Rules with 
Tax Treaties (with special references to the BEPS project), Tax Policy Series, 
Geneva/Zurich 2018, Schulthess, Chapter 18.   
43 OECD Model Tax Convention (2017): Commentary on Article 1, para. 81; Article 7, 
para. 14; Article 10, para. 37.  
44 For an extensive discussion of case law on this matter, see L. De Broe, 
International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse, supra n. 42 and V. Chand, The 
Interaction of Domestic Anti-Avoidance Rules with Tax Treaties, supra n. 42.  
45 For an extensive discussion of this matter, see L. De Broe, International Tax 
Planning and Prevention of Abuse, supra n. 42, pp. 500-566 and V. Chand, The 
Interaction of Domestic Anti-Avoidance Rules with Tax Treaties, supra n. 42, pp. 
314-360.  
46 OECD Model Tax Convention (2017): Commentary on Article 24, para. 74. 
47 OECD Model Tax Convention (2017): Commentary on Article 24, para. 79. 
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The new provision would expressly authorize the application of the 
income inclusion rule and the base eroding payments provision.48  
 
7. Compatibility with EU Law   
 
7.1. The State of play of EU law in the area of the prevention of tax 
avoidance 
 
23. For the discussion below, we assume that the Member States of the 
European Union that are also members of the Inclusive Framework 
(“IF”), would enact under their domestic laws the rules adopted by the 
IF under the GloBE-project and that the EU itself would not take a 
coordinated action by way of a Directive.49 Any actions of the Member 
States must be in accordance with the requirements imposed on such 
Member States by the rules on the fundamental freedoms under the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). Although 
this question is not specifically discussed in the present submission, let 
us also bear in mind that compliance with primary European Union law 
natually also extends to State aid rules.50 Therefore, the design of the 
GloBE proposal – including possible carve-outs51 – would need to 
comply with State aid rules.52 Further, any actions of the Member 
States must also be in line with the obligations imposed on them under 
secondary EU law, in particular under the direct tax Directives.  
                                   
48 V. Chand, The Interaction of Domestic Anti-Avoidance Rules with Tax Treaties, 
supra n. 42, Chapter 23. 
49  We believe that the principle of subsidiarity may prevent the EU Council from taking 
action by means of a Directive in this area which in our view belongs to the 
exclusive competence of the Member States.  
50  Art. 107 et seq. TFEU. 
51 On the need to provide for a carve-out to ensure compliance with fundamental 
freedoms, see below N. 29 et seq. 
52  See for example thereupon and in a different context : Commission decision of 2 
April 2019 on the State aid SA.44896 implemented in the United Kingdom 
concerning CFC Group Financing Exemption available at : 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases1/201929/271690_2063757_139
_2.pdf  
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24. In that regard it is to be recalled that it is settled case law of the CJEU 
that each Member State has the sovereign power to organize, in 
compliance with EU law, its system for taxing profits in so far as these 
profits come within the jurisdiction of the Member State concerned. 
Accordingly, each Member State is free to determine the chargeable 
event of the tax, the tax base and the tax rates on the condition that 
resident companies are not treated less favourably where they hold 
shares in companies established in other Member States compared as 
to where they hold shares in domestic companies, that branches of 
non-resident companies established in a Member State are not treated 
less favourably that companies resident in that State, that companies 
based in other Member States are not treated in a manner that is 
discriminatory in comparison with comparable resident companies and 
that cross-border transactions are not treated less favourably than 
similar domestic transactions.53 It is equally well-established case law 
that the loss of tax revenues may not be relied by a Member State as a 
justification for applying discriminatory tax rules or tax rules that 
restrict the fundamental freedoms.54  It has also been decided that tax 
measures which discriminate against resident taxpayers that have 
engaged in transactions with taxpayers based in another Member State 
that enjoy a favourable tax regime there and which aim to retaliate 
against such a tax regime are incompatible with the fundamental 
freedoms. In the terms of the CJEU “such compensatory tax 
arrangements prejudice the very foundations of the single market”.55 It 
                                   
53  See e.g. CJEU 17 May 2017, X v. Ministerraad (Belgium), C-68/15, § 41 and the 
case law cited there. See also Opinion of AG Léger in Cadbury Schweppes, C-
196/04: § 81: “The fixing of rates of corporation tax falls, as we have seen, within 
the unfettered competence of each Member State and Articles 43 EC and 48 EC 
(now Art. 49 and 54 TFEU) confer on every company in accordance with Article 48 
EC the right to set up a subsidiary in the place of its choice within the Union. A 
Member State may not, therefore, treat differently its resident companies which 
establish subsidiaries in other Member States depending on the tax rate applicable 
in the host State”.     
54  CJEU, 21 September 1999, Saint Gobain, C- 307/97, § 51; CJEU, 16 July 1998, ICI,  
C-264/96, § 28. 
55  CJEU, 26 October 1999, Eurowings, C-294/97, § 44 – 45; CJEU, 26 June 2003, 
Skandia, C-422/01, § 52. 
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follows, amongst others, that any tax advantage resulting from the low 
taxation to which a subsidiary established in a Member State other 
than the one in which the parent company is incorporated cannot by 
itself authorise the latter Member State to turn off that advantage by a 
less favourable tax treatment of the parent company had it not set up 
a subsidiary abroad.56 Likewise, a Member State cannot levy 
compensatory taxes against a resident taxpayer because it has used 
the services of a provider established in another Member State where 
the service payments enjoy a favourable tax treatment.  
 
25. A Member State may only apply discriminatory or restrictive tax rules 
if such rules are justified by a limited number of justification grounds, 
in particular the need to prevent tax avoidance (sometimes in 
combination with the need to preserve the balanced allocation of 
taxing powers between Member States57). However, where a 
justification ground is present, anti-avoidance and anti-base erosion 
measures need to comply with the general EU law principle of 
proportionality. It follows that the measures must be suitable to 
achieve the objective of the prevention of tax avoidance and do not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve that goal. General and 
irrebuttable presumptions of tax avoidance based on the fact that a 
subsidiary is based in a Member State where it benefits from a low rate 
of tax or from an advantageous tax regime (e.g. offered to activities of 
a passive nature) or that the recipient of the income enjoys a 
favourable tax regime in its State of residence or that the activities 
carried on abroad are of a passive nature, are therefore systematically 
condemned by the CJEU for failing to meet the principle of 
                                   
56  CJEU, 12 September 2006, Cadbury Schweppes, C-196/04: § 49.  
57  The justification based on the preservation of the balanced allocation of taxing 
powers is accepted where the measure is designed to prevent conduct of a 
taxpayer that is capable of jeopardising the right of a Member State to exercise its 
taxing powers on profits realised in connection with activities carried on in its 
territory (CJEU, 13 December 2005, C-446/03, §  45, CJEU, 29 March 2007, Rewe 
Zentralfinanz, C-347/04,  § 42). When the taxpayer carries on genuine commercial 
or industrial activities in Member States and such activities are remunerated by an 
arm’s length compensation, such justification is not applicable.  
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proportionality.58 This explains why the CJEU has held at several 
occasions that a national measure restricting the fundamental 
freedoms may only be justified by the need to prevent tax avoidance 
(and/or the need to ensure the balanced allocation of taxing powers 
between the Member States) where it specifically targets wholly 
artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality and the 
purpose of which is to avoid the tax normally payable on the profits 
generated by activities carried out in the territory of the Member State 
concerned.59 The CJEU has held that the performance by a subsidiary 
of trading activities excludes the existence of a wholly artificial 
arrangement which has no real economic link with the host Member 
State. It also decided that application of controlled foreign company-
legislation should be excluded where the subsidiary reflects economic 
reality. Such is the case where the incorporation of the subsidiary 
corresponds to an actual establishment which carries on genuine 
economic activities in the host Member State, regardless of whether 
the tax regime of that Member State is more beneficial than the one 
applicable in the Member State of the parent company.60  
 
7.2. Application to the measures proposed under GloBE 
 
7.2.1. The income inclusion-rule 
 
26. According to the GloBE proposal, the income inclusion-rule would tax 
the income of a foreign branch or controlled entity in the hands of the 
                                   
58  CJEU, 26 October 1999, Eurowings, C-294/97, § 43 – 45; CJEU, 12 September 
2006, Cadbury Schweppes, C-196/04: § 50 and more recently CJEU, 7 September 
2017, Eqiom, C-6/16, § 31; CJEU, 26 February 2019, X GmbH v. Finanzamt 
Stuttgart, C-135/17, § 85 – 86.  
59  CJEU, 12 September 2006, Cadbury Schweppes, C-196/04: § 51 and 55; CJEU, 13 
March 2007, Thin Cap GLO, C-524/04, § 72 and 74; CJEU, 3 October 2013, Itelcar, 
C-282/12, § 34; CJEU, 26 February 2019, X GmbH v. Finanzamt Stuttgart, C-
135/17, § 72 – 73. 
60  CJEU, 12 September 2006, Cadbury Schweppes, C-196/04: § 61 and 65 - 66. 
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parent company61 if that income is subject to tax in the State where 
that branch or controlled entity is established at an effective tax rate 
that is below a minimum rate [level to be determined]. Such a rule 
undermines the sovereign rights of the Member State to freely develop 
their fiscal policy according to the economic realities and revenue 
needs proper to each Member State. In particular it interferes 
significantly with the rights of the Member States to determine the tax 
base of and the rate at which entities established there are to be 
taxed. As it aims to recoup the tax advantages enjoyed by the 
multinational group of companies outside the State of residence of the 
parent, it raises very serious concerns from an EU law perspective.  
 
27. The rule has quite some similarities with CFC-legislation as it permits 
the State of residence of the company controlling the subsidiary or 
branch to tax on a current basis the undistributed profit of a subsidiary 
or branch where it has not been subject to a sufficient level of tax in 
the State of residence of the subsidiary or branch. Unlike a CFC-regime 
where the profit of the subsidiary or branch is taxed at the domestic 
corporate tax rate of the State of residence of the parent company 
(eventually with a foreign tax credit), under the GloBE proposal tax in 
the State of residence of the parent company on the tainted income of 
its subsidiaries or branches would operate as top up to achieve a 
minimum rate of tax.  
 
28. However, like under CFC-legislation, the effect of the GloBE proposal is 
that the undertaxed undistributed profit of subsidiaries or branches 
based in other Member States are subject to the top up tax in the 
State of residence of the parent company. Therefore, the income 
inclusion rule would - just like the CFC-legislation at stake in the above 
mentioned judgments re Cadburry Schweppes and X GmbH - 
discriminate against parent companies that have set up subsidiaries or 
branches in other Member States the profit of which is subject to an 
                                   
61  Where a foreign branch is involved, we assume the tax will be assessed against the 
head office of the company. Any further reference to “parent company” includes a 
reference to the head office of companies owning foreign branches.  
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effective tax rate which is below the set minimum rate. As explained 
above, such a fact cannot in all circumstances be regarded as abusive 
or result in a shift of taxable base from one Member State to another 
and therefore the income inclusion-rule will not be able to be justified 
on grounds of prevention of abusive tax practices or the balanced 
allocation of taxing powers because it violates the principle of 
proportionality. It follows that the rule can only be applied to 
companies with branches or subsidiaries within the European Union 
without infringing the freedom of establishment if it targets wholly 
artificial arrangements.62  
 
29. Accordingly, a carve out needs to be foreseen, like is currently the 
case for the CFC-legislation adopted under Art. 7 (2) (a) of the EU Anti 
Tax Avoidance Directive, for subsidiaries and branches established in 
another Member State that carry out genuine commercial activities by 
means of staff, assets and premises.  If such a carve out is provided, 
the possible inconsistency of the OECD’s approach with regard to 
patent box regimes which comply with the modified nexus-approach 
and therefore do not engage in harmful tax competition would also be 
removed as the relevant companies are actually engaged in R&D-
activities and carry on the necessary DEMPE-functions and assume the 
risks associated therewith. Such a carve out would also assure that the 
GloBE-proposal becomes again consistent with the basic underlying 
                                   
62  We assume that only controlled entities would come into scope of the income 
inclusion rule (e.g. shareholding of 25% or more) so that the rule needs to be 
tested against the requirements imposed by the freedom of establishment. If, 
however, the rule would apply to shareholdings below that percentage, the rule 
could come within the scope free movement of capital and then also apply to profits 
of companies based in third countries (CJEU, 26 February 2019, X GmbH v. 
Finanzamt Stuttgart, C-135/17). The CJEU added however that in the framework of 
the free movement of capital, the term wholly artificial arrangement covers any 
scheme which has as its primary objective or one of its primary objectives the 
artificial transfer of profit made by way of activities carried on in the territory of a 
Member States to third countries with a low tax rate (§84). As regards the 
application of CFC rules and income inclusion rules in the context of free movement 
of capital, see inter alia Danon R., Some Observations on the Carve-Out Clause of 
Article 7(2)(a) of the ATAD with Regard to Third Countries, in Pistone/Weber (ed), 
The Implementation of Anti-BEPS Rules in the EU: A Comprehensive 
Study, chap. 17, IBFD, 2018.  
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principle of the BEPS Actions 1 to 15, i.e. achieving that taxes are paid 
where value is created, while at the same time tackling remaining 
BEPS issues.  
 
30. The argument that the income inclusion-rule does not discriminate 
against companies that have exercised their freedom of establishment 
as the rule would also apply to companies owning domestic branches 
and subsidiaries, is not convincing.63 The extension of the rule to 
domestic situations is quite pointless and would be an act of bad tax 
policy as there is only a very remote or no risk of undertaxed profit in 
a domestic situation.64 In all likelihood, branches and subsidiaries 
established in the same Member State as the company owning them 
would not benefit from favourable tax regimes because, if they were, 
such regimes would constitute harmful tax practices and/or illegal 
state aid and be in breach of BEPS or the TFEU on such ground. 
Accordingly, for all practical purposes the income inclusion-rule will 
only or predominantly apply to cross-border investments and thus 
discriminate against companies that have exercised their freedom of 
establishment. The CJEU has held that tax rules of a Member State 
which in the large majority of cases reserve a different treatment to 
                                   
63  That would still not prevent the rule from discriminating between domestic 
companies that own subsidiaries in “normal” tax jurisdictions and those that own 
subsidiaries in “low” tax jurisdictions. The rule would breach the freedom of 
establishment on that ground alone as it accelerates the payment of the tax on the 
profits of a low taxed subsidiary, while tax on profits of a normally taxed subsidiary 
would be deferred until actual distribution to the parent company  (see CJEU, 12 
September 2006, Cadbury Schweppes, C-196/04, § 44 - 45). 
64  AG Geelhoed already criticised in very clear terms the extension of anti-abuse 
measures to domestic situations where no potential risk of abuse exists: “Nor am I 
of the view that, in order to conform with Article 43 EC (now Art. 49 TFEU), 
Member States should necessarily be obliged to extend thin cap legislation to purely 
domestic situations where no possible risk of abuse exists. I find it extremely 
regrettable that the lack of clarity as to the scope of Article 43 EC justification on 
abuse grounds has led to a situation where Member States, unclear of the extent to 
which they may enact prima facie ‘discriminatory’ anti-abuse laws, have felt obliged 
to ‘play safe’ by extending the scope of their rules to purely domestic situations 
where no possible risk of abuse exists. Such an extension of legislation situations 
falling wholly outwith its rationale for purely formalistic ends and causing 
considerable extra administrative burden for domestic companies and tax 
authorities is quite pointless and indeed counterproductive for economic efficiency. 
As such, it is the anathema to the internal market” (Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Thin 
Cap GLO, C-524/04, § 68). 
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resident taxpayers according to whether or not they have exercised 
their fundamental freedoms and tax those that have exercised such 
freedom less advantageously than those that have not, are 
incompatible with the  fundamental freedoms.65 The CJEU has also 
held that the TFEU provisions on the freedom of establishment do not 
only prohibit de jure discrimination on the basis of criteria linked with 
the fact that the company has exercised its fundamental freedoms but 
also de facto discrimination based on another objective criterion which 
in practical terms results in the majority of cases in a less favourable 
tax treatment for those companies that have exercised their 
freedoms.66 In the case at hand, such other objective criterion would 
be the fact that the branch or subsidiary has paid insufficient tax in the 
Member State where it is established and in practical terms such would 
only be the case where the company owning the branch or subsidiary 
has exercised its freedom of establishment. 
 
31. Finally, the attention is drawn to the fact that dividends which enjoy 
the participation exemption under the Parent/Subsidiary Directive 
and/or domestic rules transposing that Directive and which have not 
yet been distributed up in the chain of companies cannot be subject to 
the income inclusion-rule in the hands of the ultimate parent as such 
would lead to a breach of the rules of the Parent/Subsidiary 
Directive.67 Likewise, the attention is drawn to the fact that profits of a 
subsidiary or branch that have been subject to CFC-legislation in the 
hands of a controlling company pursuant to the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive should be excluded from the scope of the income inclusion-
rule in the hands of the ultimate parent company otherwise multiple 
taxation would arise. Alternatively, CFC-legislation should be aborted if 
the income inclusion-rule is implemented.  
                                   
65  CJEU, 26 October 1999, Eurowings, C-294/97, § 36 – 37 and 40. 
66  CJEU, 5 February 2015, Hervis Sport, C-385/12, § 37 – 39.  
67  An issue that could be relevant if the income inclusion-rule would not depart from 
the global consolidated group accounts. 
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7.2.2. Undertaxed payments-rule 
 
32. The proposed tax on base eroding payments would operate by way of 
a denial of the deduction in the hands of the paying entity or the 
imposition of a source-based taxation (including a withholding tax) for 
payments to related parties that are not subject to tax at or above the 
minimum rate in the State of the recipient. Again these rules intend to 
annihilate the tax advantages offered by the Member State of the 
recipient of the income. As explained earlier, such offsetting rules 
undermine the functioning of the internal market and are very 
problematic from an EU law point of view. 
 
33. A rule that denies the deduction of a cost item only where the 
payments are made to beneficiaries resident in another Member State 
would discriminate between payments to domestic and non-domestic 
beneficiaries and infringe several of the fundamental freedoms 
(freedom of establishment, freedom of services, free movement of 
goods and free movement of capital68). In this respect it is worth 
mentioning that the EU has informed the US Treasury that it 
considered the US BEAT-rules adopted in 2017, which assess 
supplementary US tax but only on payments to non-US related parties, 
as being discriminatory and in breach of the provisions of the WTO by 
which the US is bound.69 Under EU law, an undertaxed payment rule of 
the kind discussed here can be justified by the need to prevent tax 
avoidance and the need to preserve a balanced allocation of taxing 
powers between the Member States. However, as the proposed rule 
applies in each instance where the payment would be undertaxed in 
the State of residence of the recipient, it operates as a general, 
automatic and irrebuttable presumption of abuse or profit shifting that 
                                   
68  Where the payment would come within the scope of the free movement of capital, a 
breach of that freedom would also be at stake where the payments are made to 
beneficiaries in third countries.   
69  Letter of 11 December 2017 from the Finance Ministers of France, Germany, the 
UK, Italy and Spain to the US Treasury Secretary of State; EU Council Group to 
Discuss OECD Review of US Tax Reform, Tax Notes International, 16 April 2018. 
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would seriously impact on genuine commercial operations of all kind. It 
would therefore be a disproportionate infringement of the fundamental 
freedoms.70 Again the rule would only be compliant with these 
freedoms if it provides for a carve out for payments made in respect of 
genuine flows of goods and capital or in respect of services genuinely 
performed.71 
 
34. As discussed above with respect to the income inclusion-rule, the 
argument that the discrimination could be removed if the rule would 
also be applied to payments under domestic transaction is not 
convincing. It is indeed very doubtful that within a domestic context a 
risk of tax avoidance and profit shifting of the kind contemplated here 
would ever be present. Accordingly, even if the rule would apply also 
to domestic payment made for domestic transactions, the rule would 
entail a de facto discrimination of cross-border transactions which is 
prohibited under EU law.  
 
35. An undertaxed payment rule that would take the form of a withholding 
tax to be retained by the payor from the payment made to the non-
resident payee where the latter is not sufficiently taxed on that 
payment, also raises concerns from an EU law perspective. It is clear 
from the CJEU’s case law that the application of a withholding tax as a 
method of collecting tax from non-resident service providers and 
financiers, where resident service providers and financiers are not 
subject to such a tax may constitute a restriction to the freedom to 
provide services or the free movement of capital (e.g. because of the 
cash flow disadvantage suffered by the non-resident). However, the 
CJEU has also held that such a restriction may be justified by the need 
to ensure the effective collection of the tax from the non-resident.72 
                                   
70  CJEU, 5 July 2012, SIAT, C-318/10, § 35 – 39. 
71  CJEU, 5 July 2012, SIAT, C-318/10, § 40, 42 and § 48. Allowing the taxpayer to 
prove that such is the case would comply with the judgment in SIAT as it would 
ensure taxpayers that the rule only strikes down abusive practices and would allow 
the tax authorities to properly exercise their enforcement powers.  
72  CJEU, 13 July 2016, Brisal and KBC Finance Ireland, C-18/15, § 21; CJEU, 18 
October 2012, X Football Club, C-498/10, § 39. 
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The main discrimination issue with respect to withholding taxes lies in 
the fact that withholding taxes against non-residents are levied on the 
gross income derived by the non-resident in the State of source, while 
resident taxpayers receiving the same type of payments (and are not 
subject to withholding) pay tax in that State on their net income, i.e. 
after deduction of related expenses. Such a different treatment 
between resident and non-resident service providers and financiers 
could work to the detriment of non-residents (in particular in the 
financial industry). It is well-established case law that such a different 
treatment entails a discrimination that breaches the freedom to 
provide services or the free movement of capital.73 It follows from that 
case law that in all instances where the State of source levies tax 
against non-residents by way of withholding whereas it taxes its 
residents on net profit-basis, the non-resident taxpayers should have 
the opportunity to deduct the business expenses that are directly 
related to the activity performed in the State of source from that 
State’s tax base. Furthermore, the CJEU has recently held that levying 
withholding tax on distributions of dividends to non-resident 
companies (that were loss-making in the year the dividend was 
distributed), whereas resident loss-making companies would not pay 
corporate tax on the dividend in the year of distribution, infringes the 
TFEU rules on the free movement of capital.74 Such implies that the 
State of source should defer the levy of withholding tax until the non-
resident company becomes profitable in its State of residence. 
Needless to say that such makes a system of withholding tax 
extremely difficult to administer. 
 
36. Withholding tax rules may also discriminate between non-resident 
recipients if, under the domestic law of the State of source, residents 
                                   
73  CJEU, 13 July 2016, Brisal and KBC Finance Ireland, C-18/15, § 21; CJEU, 15 
February 2007, Centro Equestre, C-345/04, § 23; CJEU, 3 October 2006, Scorpio, 
C-290/04, § 42, CJEU, 12 June 2003, Gerritse, C-234/01, § 29 and 55. Where the 
payment would come within the scope of the free movement of capital, a breach of 
that freedom would also be at stake where the payments are made to beneficiaries 
in third countries. 
74  CJEU, 22 November 2018, Sofina, C-575/17. 
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of one Member State receiving income from that State are subject to a 
higher withholding tax than residents of another Member State 
receiving the same income.75 This is likely to happen in the case at 
hand. For practical purposes, a withholding tax can only be assessed 
where the recipient of the payment is subject to a nominal tax rate 
below the minimum threshold as the paying agent cannot determine 
the effective tax rate of the recipient at the time the liability for 
withholding arises. This would mean that the recipient does not suffer 
withholding tax where it is subject to a nominal tax rate in its State of 
residence above the minimum threshold even if it pays low corporate 
tax there because it has eroded its tax base. On the other hand, a 
recipient that is subject to a nominal tax rate in his State of residence 
which is lower than the minimum threshold but pays tax on a non-
eroded tax base is subject to withholding. Such leads to unequal 
treatment of taxpayers which are in light of the objective of the 
undertaxed payment rule (i.e. the withholding tax in the State of 
source) in a comparable situation.76 In that case, the relevant TFEU 
freedom will be infringed and no justification comes to mind to explain 
this infringement.   
 
37. Finally, we would like to draw your attention to the fact that the 
levying of withholding taxes could be in breach of the Interest and 
Royalty Directive. Such would be the case where interest and royalty 
payments would be made between associated enterprises that are 
residents of the EU for tax purposes and meet the other conditions set 
out in the Directive to qualify for withholding tax exemption in the 
                                   
75  CJEU, 24 February 2015, Sopora, C-512/13, § 25; CJEU, 11 June 2009, 
Commission v. the Netherlands, C-521/07, § 38 – 39. 
76  Assume that the minimum GloBE-rate is set at 15%. Taxpayer Aco in Member State 
A is subject to a nominal rate of 12,5%. Aco is subject to withholding in the State 
of source because the nominal rate in Member State A is below 15%. Aco receives 
a payment of 100 (net of withholding) which is entirely taxed in MS A.  Aco pays an 
effective tax of 12,5 in Member State A. Taxpayer Bco in Member State B is subject 
to a nominal rate of 30%. Bco is not subject to withholding in the State of source 
because the nominal rate in Member State B exceeds 15%. Bco receives a payment 
of 100, but only 20 of it is taxed in Member State B. Bco pays an effective tax of 6 
in Member State B.  
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State of source.  
 
********** 
